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We have just learned that the Inter-American Defense Board has been re-born and is now a two-year old toddler. Yet we also know that, despite its very able new Brazilian leadership, this toddler is burdened with the dead weight of history. Past and present civil-military tensions, differing national interests, fears of US power and interventions, regional politics and ambitions, and other obstacles too numerous to catalogue still often prevent the IADB from providing the technical support the political organs of the OAS need.

We have also learned that NATO demonstrates that cooperation can bring major benefits despite disparities in interests and power among its members. Yet we also know that the Americas today face no clear and present external challenge like the Soviet threat that made possible the organization of NATO in the first place. Moreover, in the Americas today, the driving consensus on security today is multidimensional, without a single organizing focus.

Do these uncertainties really matter? We all know that, as a general rule, multilateralism is only given lip service.

- Big countries feel they don't need it – they worry that working to get the agreement of others will just slow things down and limit or constrain what they can do.
- Bureaucrats don't like it because it means more work – more dealing with objections, more time spent with foreigners, more clearances.
- Pragmatists see it as counting angels on the heads of pins without points.
- Economists don't like it because it costs money.
- Nationalists don't like it because it implies a reduction of sovereignty.
- Politicians only like it when they can attack their opponents as unilateralists who disregard the common opinion of mankind which they define as agreeing with them.
- Ordinary folk see multilateral debates as a waste of time in talk shops chasing utopias instead of solving real problems.
- And the ultimate insult is that multilateral forums are often not even good talk shops, as representatives carefully duck any public discussion of sensitive issues.

Not surprisingly, the sum of these dislikes is that multilateralism often does not work. And yet . . . and yet Unless you want to be stuck trying to deal with problems all alone, by yourself, you need a framework that will make it possible to cooperate with others. From the simplest standards of weights and measures to the most arcane theories of the meaning of the state system and the attributes of sovereignty, common action requires a common framework.

Multilateralism is how you build that framework. Multilateralism should be seen as a basic component of any action outside one's own borders. Multilateralism is different from multinationalism. Multinationalism is a temporary "coalition of the willing" – a group of governments that have come together to try to deal with a particular issue. Multilateralism implies a long term commitment by a specific group of states to creating a particular regional or international order based on the set of principles specified in a treaty-based Charter.

Multilateralism creates the legal and political framework that explains, justifies and sustains common action. It is always possible to act unilaterally, but for even the most powerful acting in accordance with a multilateral framework will make the action more legitimate – that is, more understandable and acceptable to others – and thus more effective as well. And there are situations in which multilateral action is a necessity, not a choice.

From 1995 to 1998, I was the representative of the United States in the effort to end fighting between Ecuador and Peru. Five thousand Special Forces soldiers from the two countries were confronting each other in very difficult Andean terrain. We needed to separate them and then try to find a lasting solution to a dispute that went back to colonial times. Four countries -- Brazil, Argentina, Chile and the U.S. – acted together as treaty guarantors. All contributed soldiers to the separation of forces and subsequent military observation. My guarantor counterparts and I would share intelligence, listen to each other's views and meet until we hammered out a course all our governments could support. The issues were difficult. But the give and take was mutual. Often our meetings led to a course different from anything any one of us had started with. It took three years, but we succeeded when few believed we could. Multilateralism worked.

One could argue that this was a special case. Only six countries were involved, and the legal framework to deal with the crisis had already been designed. But my experience at the OAS suggests that with patience and perseverance multilateralism can work in larger settings as well.

Here is a partial list of the problems discussed yesterday:

- Disease
- Natural Disasters
- Trade
- Debt
- Oil
- Stability Operations
- Counternarcotics
- Counterterrorism

- Arms Smuggling
- Development

The war on drugs is often understood as having what was referred to yesterday as a “balloon effect” that transcends individual countries. But that is true to an important extent of all of these problems. Let us take the case of Colombia, showcased here this morning as an example of successful integrated cooperation between the United States and Colombia. And let us take two issues: the first is the failure to fully integrate economic policy with the struggle against narcotics and terrorism. How else can one explain that the FTA is bogged down in the U.S. Congress despite the success of Plan Colombia? And second, the failure to account for the balloon effect. How else can one explain the failure to work with Ecuador to contain the bulge created by the success of Plan Colombia?

Today’s globalized world requires that most problems, whether we want to or not, whether we realize it or not, must be addressed with a strategy that integrates all the elements of power.

You can’t just say “We’ll deal with this just militarily, or just economically, or just diplomatically.” You can’t just say “We’ll deal with this multilaterally, that bilaterally, and this unilaterally.” Most important problems require the simultaneous application in some form of all elements of power, military and diplomatic, multilateral and bilateral.

Yesterday, we heard much the same argument applied to the US interagency system. But what happens if we in the U.S. solve all of our own internal interagency and civil-military problems only to then find we and other countries still lack the trust and know-how to work together?

That is where multilateralism comes in. Multilateralism provides the legal and institutional framework for multilateral cooperation. A friend of mine was discussing these issues, and was asked “But why do we need the OAS and the IADB if we have US Southern Command?” And the equally simple answer is, because the US Southern Command represents only one country, the United States. If you want more than one country to be represented, not at the level of a particular ministry or political grouping, but of a government that commits the nation, you need a multilateral process.

Over the past decade or so, international organizations – the United Nations, the Organization of American States, to cite the two most relevant to the Western hemisphere – have lost both authority and resources.

To reverse that deterioration,

- We need to build the international confidence, skills, institutions and relationships needed for both defense and security.
- We need to strengthen professional links and to increase support for education, technology and social development.
- We need improved civil military relations and coordination, not just in the United States, but in individual countries in Latin America and the Caribbean as well.

One of the biggest mistakes of the Summit of the Americas process that started in 1994 was the exclusion of the Minister of Defense and thus the creation of a separate military track. The Conference of Ministers of Defense should be included in the Summit Process and the OAS system so as to consolidate civilian guidance and legitimize military technical advice.

International organizations are not a panacea. Like most national organizations, they need the active support of their members. And it is important to distinguish between agreement and implementation. Most operational matters must of necessity be dealt with bilaterally or in groups of nations smaller than the whole. Even then, however, at least some international civil servants may be essential to provide non partisan, neutral know-how in support of agreed activities.

The starting point of multilateral action is the rule of law. *"The decision not to sign on to legal frameworks the rest of the world supports is central to the decline in American influence in the world."* Those are not my words, they are those of Sandra Day O'Connor, appointed to the US Supreme Court by Ronald Reagan.

The U.S. should put an end to the use of Guantanamo for detentions, end Article 98 sanctions against countries that join the International Criminal Court, and ratify the American Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, generally known by its Spanish acronym CIFTA. We have signed both; we should ratify both with whatever reservations might prove necessary.

Putting laws on the books, of course, is not enough. Compliance depends on enforcement. The OAS in recent years has worked hard to reduce slips twixt the cup and the lip. Meetings of States Parties follow up treaties to improve compliance. The harmonization of national laws to bring them in line with treaty mandates has scored notable successes on anti-corruption, extradition, and control of illegal drugs.

The U.S. Government deserves much credit for its financial and technical support to many of these activities. The Administration has invited the Ministers of Justice of the hemisphere to meet in Washington this month. But the United States and most other countries of the hemisphere could and should do much more to support regional capacity-building.

To increase common standards and training for experts in drug control, terrorism, transnational crime, human rights, civil emergencies, and the mitigation of natural disasters, the model of the Inter-American Defense College could be used to create a new Inter-American Academy of Public Administration, with students nominated by the member states. Sub-regional groups -- CARICOM, SICA, the Andean Pact, and MERCOSUR -- could be put to excellent use regionally-supported training activities in whose design they participate. All countries should reserve places in their diplomatic and military academies and other advanced schools of public service for counterparts from neighboring countries.

International professional training and coordination should not be considered foreign aid – they are necessary to build the capacity required to make programs sustainable regionally and internationally. It is all well and good to have great initiatives, but what

happens if you don't have people who can make them work? Hearing Jim Locher and Eric Kjonnerod yesterday, I was most impressed with their work on developing an inter-agency cadre of National Security Professionals. I would go even further: Every U.S. department and agency should have a core of public servants who spend part of their careers working in the UN, the OAS, or other international organizations. Stealing a page from Goldwater-Nichols, such a tour might even be a requirement for promotion to the Senior Executive Service and the Senior Foreign Service!

Institutional ties that are maintained across countries by a network of professionals who know how to work together can provide both early warning and containment of issues that might otherwise escalate into problems—in effect, a valuable insurance policy for progress and peace.

This is of necessity a long-term approach. It takes time to educate and train people, time to build trust. It is not enough to know where you want to go. You also need to know how to get there. In international politics there is no MapQuest where you can punch up directions. You need rules. You need skill. And you need friends. Nothing will last unless the interests of all concerned are advanced.

In short, we have an urgent need for a “diplomatic surge” to revalidate legal frameworks, and a “consultation surge” to forge common standards and enable countries to calibrate the application of power. Some of this is happening now. The OAS is planning to convene ministers of interior and security in October to consider public security issues. Plans are being drawn up to create a Contact Office in the OAS Secretariat to improve liaison with the IADB on defense matters. But there will be plenty of work left for next US Administration to continue this transformation, with better intelligence sharing, improved coordination, and openness toward global as well as regional cooperation and participation.

Thank you very much.